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R. ROBERT L. FINE. Professor
Thomas Mayo is Jommg me
today to talk about treatment
for the dymg patient: medical ethics
and the law. Tom is an associate professor of law at Southern Methodist
University and a scholar m health law
and b10ethics. He also is an ad1unct
professor m the Department of Internal Medicme at The University of
Texas
Southwestern Medical School
Robert L Fme, MD
Tom serves on numerous ethics committees m North Texas. He cochairs
the ethics committee of Parkland Memorial Hospital and has served on our
own ethics committee for years. He is
a wise teacher and scholar and is well
known for his expertise m health law
and medical ethics.
When Professor Mayo and I first
discussed physician-assisted smcide
and euthanasia as part of the spectrum
Thomas w Mayo, JD
of treatment alternatives for dymg patients, we did not know how timely
the topic would become. Recently, the first 2 cases oflegally sanctioned physician-assisted smcide were reported m Oregon Meanwhile, a rogue respiratory therapist at a California hospital
confessed to killmg dozens of his patients whom he deemed to
be deservmg of some type of active euthanasia Of course, Dr
Jack Kevorkian has either killed or assisted m the deaths of> 100
patients.
I want to start by walkmg you through the poem titled "How
Annandale Went Out" ( 1), written around the turn of the century by the Pulitzer Pnze-wmnmg American poet Edwm Arlmgton Robmson (1869-1935). Annandale is a character who
appears m several of Robmson's wrinngs In this poem, the
speaker, m fact, is a physician.
They called it Annandale-and I was there
To flourish, to fmd words, and to attend
Liar, physician, hypocrite, and fnend,
I watched him, and the sight was not so fair
BUMC PR6CEEDINGS 1998,11187-194

As one or two that I have seen elsewhere
An apparatus not for me to mendA wreck, with hell between him and the end,
remamed of Annandale, and I was there
I knew the rum as I knew the man,
So put the two together, if you can,
Remembenng the worst you know of me
Now, view yourself as I was, on the spotW 1th a slight kmd of engme Do you see 7
Like this
You wouldn't hang me? I thought not

In the first stanza, the physician is very honest about what
we physicians sometimes are-sometimes liars, sometimes hypocrites, and sometimes fnends to our patients The physician is
seemg a patient whom he refers to as an "it," as an "apparatus,"
as a "wreck," with hell between now and the death to come.
Unlike Jack Kevorkian, this physician is saymg, "I knew this man
when he was well, and I know what he is now" The physician's
only weapon agamst Annandale's impendmg h~llish road to
death is a "slight kmd of engme"-the cylmder and piston of a
syrmge When we get to the end of the poem, the physician has
euthanized or killed the patient
I would like to put you on the spot and ask how many are
willing to hang this physician for his act10ns? Perhaps hangmg
is too strong a punishment. How many would at least condemn
the physician and say that you are troubled with what he did?
The mdecision about both the propriety and punishment, if only
for the actions described m this poem, reflects our long-standmg ambivalence about the alternative of active euthanasia for
the dymg patient And yet, active euthanasia is only one alternative of several we shall explore.
So, what, then, are the options for the dymg patient and the
physician, nurse, or chaplam "on the spot" with the patient 7
Obv10usly, the first is contmued aggressive treatment-what I
like to refer to as medical practice by technologic imperative: "I
dialyze, therefore, I am." Medical practice by technologic imperative follows the witticism, "To the person who owns a hammer,
everything looks like a nail "You Just keep pushmg the technology at the patient, even when it is no longer beneficial or constructive.Thankfully, I thmk m American medicme right now we
have evolved to a pomt where most recognize that there are lim187
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its to technology. As powerful and seemingly muaculous as it may
often be, there comes a point where continuing aggressive treatment is no longer in the best interest of the dying patient. We
are relearning to practice with what I call the ethical and the
spmtual imperative. We ask not only what can be done technically, but what should be done. By asking the question, we enter
an ethical and even a spmtual dimension of healing, and we find
that there are 4 basic opt10ns that are practiced in this country:
passive euthanasia, induect euthanasia, physician-assisted smcide, and active euthanasia. There remams considerable misunderstanding about these terms; the following are the standard
defmitions denved from the ethics literature.
Passive euthanasia is terminating or withholding life-sustaining treatment, thereby allowing the patient to die This is the
most traditional way that physicians allow patients to die. It dates
back to the Hippocratic tradition 2500 years ago when those
physicians recognized that there were times when everything was
not possible in medicme, and it was time to withdraw treatment
and let nature take its course If you realize that 80% of the deaths
m America occur in health care institutions of some sort, most
of them hospitals, and that 80% of those deaths are preceded by
consctous dec1S1ons either to withhold or withdraw medical
therapy, you realize how common passive euthanasia has become.
The second opt10n is the practice of indirect euthanasia This
is the administering of narcotics or other pharmaceuticals to
relieve pain, dyspnea, nausea, or other symptoms of dying with
the unintended or incidental consequence of death
The thud option is physician-assisted suicide. This is the option that has been adopted in the state of Oregon Physicianassisted smcide occurs when the physician provides medicat10ns
or other intervent10ns with the understanding that the patient
intends to use those medications to commit smcide In other
words, it is not subtle; it 1s open and aboveboard. The doctor who
prescnbes the medication knows exactly what is going to be done
with it. Perhaps the strongest proponent of this is the oncologist Dr. Timothy Qmll.
Finally, there is active euthanasia-intentionally administering medications or other mtervent10ns to cause the patient's
death, which is what is going on in the Annandale poem. We
know that active euthanasia is not Just practiced by fictional
physicians but occurs, at least on occas10n, m real life as well.
Passive euthanasia and induect euthanasia have become the
standards of practice, for better or worse, in our country when it
comes to acknowledging that a patient is going to die and decidmg how that is going to occur.
Despite this, there are obvious times when, at least in some
people's minds, passive euthanasia and induect euthanasia are not
optimal or best treatments Clearly, the citizens of the state of
Oregon hold this belief. Interestingly, at least a couple of Junes
who sat in Judgment over Dr Jack Kevorkian believe that passive and induect euthanasia are not optimal treatments and have
refused to condemn him for engaging in active euthanasia
We are going to explore the alternatives of physician-assisted
smcide and active euthanasia in a little more depth. They are
obv10usly not identical, but in both cases the physician intends
to kill or aid in the killing of a patient who could otherwise be
kept alive I will cover the ethical arguments about these, and
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Professor Mayo will cover some of the legal issues But fust, let
me give you some of the histoncal background.
The ethics of active euthanasia have been debated throughout medical history. In Hippocratic times, active euthanasia was
practiced in ancient Greece. The Hippocratic physicians who
refused to give a "deadly potion" were actually taking a minority view Histoncally, this became the maJonty view of medicine,
yet not without continuous debate.
Str Thomas More (1478-1535) and Su Francis Bacon
(1561-1626), to name only 2 important Western philosophers,
believed that active euthanasia was appropnate for physioans to
engage m. Similarly, about 4 centunes later m the USA, there
was a bill m the Oh10 legislature to legalize active euthanasia.
The bill was defeated, but the debate did occur To bnng us upto-date, m 1997 Oregon passed a bill that officially approved
physician-assisted smcide. This bill resembles some of the rules
that are m place in the Netherlands pertammg to active euthanasia.
The ethical arguments, either for or agamst physicianassisted smcide and active euthanasia, center around autonomy,
beneficence, intent and actwn, and public policy concerns. Autonomy
is a key concern m our society It is the notion that each of us
ought to be self-governing, we ought to have control over ourselves Proponents of active euthanasia argue that the nght to
self-governance is absolute and must include the ultimate autonomous act of choosing when and how to die. Around the turn
of the century, Eugene Debbs, the social philosopher and labor
organizer, stated, "Human life is sacred, but only to the extent
that it contnbutes to the JOY and happmess of the one possessmg 1t and to those about him, and 1t ought to be the pnvilege of
every human being to cross the River Styx in the boat ofh1s own
choosmg when further human agony cannot be Justified by the
hope offuture health and happiness." (2) Opponents argue that
not all voluntary acts are Justified by autonomy. John Stuart Mill
said, "1t 1s not freedom to be able to alienate his freedom " (3)
That is, autonomy does not grant one the freedom to give away
that freedom Furthermore, as a society we limit many voluntary
acts, including dueling or the voluntary selling of oneself into
slavery. Opponents of unlimited autonomy suggest 1t 1s not absolute, that we belong either to God or community
Arguments about physician-assisted smcide also center on
the concept of beneficence There 1s the idea that in the practice
of med1cme we go to the house of the sick for the benefit of the
sick. We are there to do good. Proponents of active euthanasia
say that, in the face of unmitigated suffenng, the most beneficent act is to kill the patient. A duty to practice beneficently,
then, can become a duty to kill the suffenng patient
As I have looked back through medtcal histones, perhaps
the best example that I have found of the notion of beneficence
fulfilled through killing is m the wntmgs of Dr. Adma BladySzwaJgier m the Warsaw Children's Hospital Dr. SzwaJgier was
a Viennese-trained pediatncian who completed her residency
around 1939. She was picked up by the NaztS and confined to
the Warsaw ghetto where she proceeded to establish and run the
children's hospital. As you can imagine, they had very little
medicine, and penodically Jews were taken out and sent to the
killing camps.
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Late m the war, the remammg Jews m the ghetto revolted
agamst the Nazis and killed several German soldiers At that
pomt, the Nazis came mto the ghetto and began shooting and
executmg every Jewish person they could fmd. Dr Szwaigier had
already seen German soldiers kill Jewish children by banging
their heads agamst a wall m order to save bullets As the Nazis
approached the hospital, she admmistered sedatives and pam
killers she had hoarded and actively euthamzed the children on
her wards She actually managed to survive but did not publish
her memoir I Remember Nothing More until she was nearly 80
years old (4). She clearly felt that the unmitigated suffering of
her patients demanded somethmg that made her mtensely uncomfortable, the killmg of her patients. On readmg her memoir, I felt that she was actmg out of a sense of love for her patients,
and that, m tellmg her story many years later, she was still showmg love for her patients
Opponents of beneficence do not accept this argument.
They say that the most beneficent act m the face of suffermg 1s,
m fact, good palliative care The rare cases of unm1t1gated suffering do not Justify changmg medtcme's historic rules They
basically appeal back to the H1ppocrat1c trad1t1on of refusmg to
give a deadly potion.
Another ethical argument focuses on intent and action Proponents of active euthanasia and physician-assisted smcide argue that mtent and action are ummportant. They say that 1f
passive euthanasia 1s acceptable, then active euthanasia also must
be acceptable, because the end results that count are that the
patient is dead and that the patient could not have been kept
alive m either case These proponents go on to argue that 1t 1s
d1smgenuous for those m support of only passive euthanasia or
mduect euthanasia to say that they do not mtend for the patient
to die when they withdraw treatment or engage m aggressive
symptom control to the pomt of terminal sedation
Opponents of active euthanasia and phys1cian-ass1sted smCide state that the end results are not nearly as important morally as are mtent and action For example, m our society we draw
a d1stmction between mvoluntary manslaughter and mtentional
murder. In both of these cases, obviously the person has died, but
the mtent was different. When we talk about passive euthanasia and physician-assisted smc1de, the mtent of passive euthanasia
is said to be to relieve suffering by allowmg nature to take its
course, not to kill the patient. The action engaged m is the withdrawal of treatment that rs not really prolonging life so much as
prolongmg dymg. Opponents of active euthanasia and phys1c1anassisted smc1de who favor passive and mdirect euthanasia argue
that when they practice mdirect euthanasia, their mtent 1s to
relieve suffermg by the act of g1vmg only enough medication to
relieve that suffermg. I can guarantee you that a lot of you who
have stood at the bedside of a dymg patient, nurses m particular
man mtens1ve care umt settmg, have wrestled with this, thmkmg, "Well, I've got this order for morphme. How much can I give
to relieve suffering and yet not engage actively m killmg my
patient 7" It does put nurses, particularly, man awkward spot
Fmally, there are the public policy debates about euthanasia
Proponents of active euthanasia and phys1cian-ass-1sted smc1de
argue that euthanasia happens already but man unregulated fashion There are certam polls suggesting that physicians do, on rare
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occasions, engage m this process I know that members of the
Dallas medical commumty have, because we have discussed 1t
privately. Proponents argue that it 1s bad for society to erect false
barriers to a practice that 1s tolerated or endorsed by so many
members of the soCiety
Furthermore, proponents of active euthanasia and physicianassisted smc1de state that by makmg these act1v1ties legally available, patients will be protected by careful regulation of the
practice. This 1s one of the arguments made m Oregon that I
thmk helped carry that statute through the legislature. They go
on to state that patients who might refuse to embark upon certam aggressive treatments for fear of bemg trapped by the treatment would now know that they have this legal right to engage
m active euthanasia or phys1cian-ass1sted smc1de. Moreover, they
would have the ability to end their lives qmckly and easily 1f
thmgs did not turn out the way they wanted. Proponents argue
that 1f active euthanasia or phys1c1an-ass1sted smc1de were legally
available, 1t would empower patients to accept more aggressive
treatments than they currently accept
Opponents obviously disagree with everythmg that I have
Just said Basically, the public policy opposltlon to active euthanasia and phys1cian-ass1sted smcide falls mto what may be called
the slippery slope factor That ts, 1f you go over the edge Just a
little bit, you are gomg to slide right down the mountam. In 1920,
Hoche and Bmdmg published The Permission to Kill Life Unworthy of Life ("lebens unwertes Leben") (5). Itwas widely subscribed
to by most of orgamzed German med1cme, and rt convinced the
maJority of German phys1c1ans that there were some human
condmons that were so bad, the suffermg was so horrible, the
disease was so d1sf1gurmg, or 1t caused the patient to be so far
beneath what was considered to be human, that 1t was okay to
kill the patient I German physicians and nurses actually murdered
several hundred thousand retarded, deformed, demented, and
chromcally 111 Aryan c1t1zens before they began ktllmg Jews who
were seen as socially defective.
Opponents of phys1cian-ass1sted smc1de and active euthanasia who look at the Dutch experience fmd little hope that the
Dutch will behave better than the Germans The Netherlands
has tolerated active euthanasia, the mtentional admimstrat10n
of a drug by the physician to kill patients, for qmte a few years
now as long as physicians followed certam safeguards. The safeguards are that the patient has to request active euthanasia repeatedly, the patient has to have unmitigated suffermg that
cannot be relieved by any other means, and there has to be a
second opm1on that agrees with the act.
To fmd out how well this was bemg practiced, the Dutch
government set up a comm1ss10n under their attorney general,
Remelmk (6). This comm1ss10n conducted a prospective study
by 405 Dutch physicians who reviewed 5197 deaths. They
showed that, on average, there were about 9000 requests for active euthanasia per year m the Netherlands, with about one third
of those actually occurring. That 1s, two thirds of the requests
did not lead to an active ktllmg of the patient. The 3000 cases
of active euthanasia a year came to 1.8% of all deaths m the
Netherlands Opponents of active euthanasia and phys1cianass1sted smc1de note that m 40% of the Dutch cases, at least 1
of 3 safeguards were violated. It turned out that 84% of all Dutch
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phys1c1ans had discussed active euthanasia at least once, and 54%
had part1e1pated m 1t
What would these numbers look like 1f extrapolated to the
Umted States? Look around this room and 1magme that >80%
of you would have discussed active euthanasia with your patients
and >50% would have engaged m 1t at least once. There would
be about 150,000 requests for active euthanasia a year, with
50,000 actual cases occurnng, and, 1f we were not any better than
the Dutch at followmg the gmdelmes, there would be 20,000
violations of the proposed safeguards
THOMAS W. MAYO. Obviously, the debate over phys1cianass1sted smc1de and active euthanasia has moved out of medical
school grand rounds and medical Journal settmgs and has become
a matter of public debate, public leg1slat1on, and public controversy. The public d1mens1on of this debate has not always been
'I

I:

As long as basic respect for the patient's choices is
observed, terminating life~sustaining care to the
point of terminal sedation does not raise a criminal
or civil legal issue in any state.
respectful of the kmds of d1stmctions that Bob has carefully laid
out this mornmg It has not always been the most well mformed
of debates, but 1t has, nonetheless, certamly begun with some
vigor, and 1s not about to get turned around or stopped. I will
discuss the form m which some of these public developments
have occurred m order to see where the law leaves us on this
question m 1998
First, let us start with public opm1on. It 1s often said that two
thirds of Amencans support phys1cian-ass1sted smc1de, and 1t 1s
often said that two thirds of Amencans oppose phys1e1an-ass1sted
smc1de It turns out that both of these propositions are correct
It all depends on the question that 1s bemg asked and how the
chmces are framed.
A more careful review of public opm1on pollmg data shows
that roughly one third of Amencans are agamst phys1c1anass1sted smc1de, no matter how one descnbes 1t, and regardless
of what kmds of safeguards are suggested by way of lim1tmg this
type of euthanasia Another one third of Amencans are m favor of phys1c1an-ass1sted smc1de as a general proposition and are
really qmte supportive of 1t.
Then there 1s a fmal one third m the middle who are mostly
agamst phys1c1an-ass1sted smc1de but who agree that 1t probably
does have some role as a treatment option m certam extreme
circumstances This middle group, dependmg on how the question gets phrased, flips to one side or the other of a yes-or-no
chmce when the pollmg 1s done.
Let us examme where the states have come out legislatively
with regard to these different types of euthanasia Both passive
euthanasia and mdirect euthanasia ( the so-called "double-effect"
death) are legal m all 50 states As long as basic respect for the
patient's chmces 1s observed, termmatmg life-sustammg care to
the pomt of termmal sedat10n does not raise a cnmmal or civil
legal issue m any state Similarly, the Amencan Medical Assa-
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c1ation has been pretty mfluential m the public debate, has been
very active m litigation at the US Supreme Court, and has lobbied state and federal legislators extensively The Amencan
Medical Assoc1at1on's pos1t10n 1s that termmatmg life support
and termmal sedation (or double-effect death) are consistent
with its ethical canons.
Phys1cian-ass1sted smc1de, on the other hand, 1s illegal nght
now m 48 states, all but Oregon, whose statute we will discuss
later, and Massachusetts, which has no statute law on the subJect In addition to 48 states, the D1stnct of Columbia has banned
phys1c1an-ass1sted smc1de. The Amencan Medical Association
has taken a posltlon consistently over the years that phys1cianass1sted smc1de 1s not permitted under its eth1eal canons S1m1larly, at the far end of the spectrum, active euthanasia 1s also not
permitted by the Amencan Medical Assoc1at10n's ethical gmdelines and would be considered some form of hom1e1de m all 50
states as thmgs currently stand. That 1s the background for what
has become a very mterestmg legal battle m the courts over the
status of proh1b1t10ns by the states agamst phys1c1an-ass1sted sme1de.
To grasp this debate fully, however, 1t 1s important to remember a couple of thmgs about lmgation m the US Supreme Court
on these matters. The very first so-called nght-to-d1e case decided
by the Supreme Court only m 1990 was the case of Cruzan vs
Director, Missouri Department of Health (497 US 261 [1990]). This
case mvolved a young woman, Nancy Beth Cruzan, who, at the
time of the commencement of litigat10n, had been m a persistent vegetative state for about 5 years. By the time the case went
before the Supreme Court, she had been in a vegetative state for
nearly 8 years She was m a state facility, and the physicians who
worked at that facility opposed the request of her parents that
tube feedmgs be d1scontmued.
In the state courts, Cruzan vs Director, Missouri Department
of Health, ended up bemg litigated all the way to the M1ssoun
Supreme Court. That court imposed a number of qmte severe
limitations on the nght of parents or other surrogate dec1S1onmakers to choose to d1scontmue hfe-sustammg treatments m the
cases of patients who are unable to speak and choose for themselves The limitations mvoked consisted of ev1dentiary and
burden-of-proof rules. The court said that dec1s1on-makers had
to show that patients themselves had md1cated that they preferred not to have aggressive hfe-sustammg treatment. Further,
this proof had to be shown with clear and convmcmg evidence,
the highest standard of e1v1l proof at tnal. M1ssoun 1s not the only
state that has adopted this pos1t10n. New York, hke a number of
other states, 1s m hne with M1ssoun
The rulmg of the M1ssoun Supreme Court raised a s1gmf1cant issue: Were some types of severe hm1tat10ns perm1ss1ble on
a patient's chmce (although, m this case, Nancy Beth Cruzan's
parents-not the patient-were makmg the dec1S1on) or were
these hm1tat10ns gomg too far m hm1tmg chmces at the end of
hfe? This issue was litigated up to the US Supreme Court
The US Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the US
Constitution prevents states from 1mposmg severe procedural
ev1dentiary hm1tat1ons on family members' end-of-hfe chmces
The Supreme Court ruled that there ts nothmg m the US Constitution that says states cannot impose these fairly extreme

OCTOBER

1998

TREATMENT ALTERNATIVES FOR THE DYING PATIENT MEDICAL ETHICS AND THE LAW

measures. It said that, although there may be some outer constitutional pnnciple that might come mto play m a different sort
of case, passive euthanasia is pnmanly a matter of state law, and
the states have an extremely free hand and very broad authonty
to develop their own rules m this area
In additton, m a senes of opmions m this case, the Court
expressed an almost wistful desire for the mcreased use of advanced directives, i e., hvmg wills or durable powers of attorney
for health care Had there been an advanced directive, Cruzan
potentially would have been qmte a different case, and the failure to respect the advanced directive executed by the patient
might well have raised a more acute constitut10nal question for
the Court There is certamly a suggestton m the opmions of 8 of
the 9 Justices that Cruzan could have come out the other way
had there been a hvmg will or a durable power of attorney for
health care Moreover, even on the issue of whether state law or
federal law governs m this area, the Supreme Court decision was
a 5 to 4 declSlon The Supreme Court was extremely spht even
over this fairly straightforward propositton.
Just this last term, the Supreme Court had an occasion to
consider the legahty of prohibitions agamst physician-assisted
smcide m the cases of Washington vs Glucksburg ( 117 S. Ct 2303
[1997]),mWashmgtonState,andVaccovs Qwll(ll7S Ct 2293
[1997]), m New York Tim Qmll, a named plamtiff m one of these
cases, is one of the most articulate proponents of the position that
physician-assisted smcide ought to be regarded as an ethical optton In both of these cases, groups of physicians and patients
challenged state laws that prohibited physician-assisted smcide
across the board In both of these cases, mtermediate federal appellate courts, the 9th Circmt and the 2nd C1rcmt, ruled that the
prohibittons were unconstituttonal. This meant that, as a matter
of either substantive due process under the 14th amendment or
equal protection under the 14th amendment, prohibit10ns hke
those m Washmgton and New York were unconstituttonal and
had to fall.
The impact of these decisions was potentially qmte strong,
because the 9th Circmt embraces 9 states, or the entire western
part of the USA. The 2nd Circmt embraces New York, Connecticut, and Vermont When you add up the populations of these 2
ctrcmts, about one third of the population of the USA hves m
states that are covered by the rulmgs of these 2 mtermediate
appellate courts It looked as though all of the laws prohibitmg
physician-assisted sutcide m these states, at least, were unconstitutional if these decisions were allowed to stand. Obviously,
the Supreme Court would have some mterest m cleanng up the
law m an area that would affect one third of the population of
the USA So, the Court granted review m these cases and handed
down its opmions last spnng
The ftrst part of their holdmg is probably the most important Just as it did m the Cruzan case, the Court said that states
have a wide area of discretion to legislate m accordance with
their view of pceferred public policy. This authonty mcludes the
authonty to prohibit physician-assisted smcide, as Washmgton
and New York have done and as Texas did about 2 decades ago.
Consequently, the rulmg here is that neither the due process
clause nor the equal protection clause of the US Constitution
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hmits state choice m this area, at least if the ch01ce is to prohibit physician-assisted smcide.
Other portions of the opmion are worth notmg. In one passage, the Supreme Court tned to draw a distmction between
passive euthanasia and physician-assisted smcide The argument
had been made that, given the mvolvement of medical personnel m producmg the death of a patient, physician-assisted smetde and passive euthanasia ought to be viewed as roughly the
same thmg The Court said no, that really is not true as a matter
of Amencan law. The Court used both causation and mtent to
try to show this Fust, the mtent with passive euthanasia is to
reheve suffenng, not pnmanly to produce the patient's death,
although it may be understood with mdirect euthanasia or
double-effect that death is a foreseeable but umntended side effect of palliative care The mtent, however, is to reheve suffermg only and not to achieve death as a means of domg that. In
the Court's view, the causative agent with physician-assisted suicide is a lethal dose of painkiller, whereas the causative agent with
indirect euthanasia or double effect is a therapeutic dose of painkiller
that was carefully calibrated and delivered to the patient with
the mtentton and design to reheve pam only but turned out to
be a dose that was enough to produce the patient's death Agam,
proponents of physician-assisted smcide see these distmctions as
dancmg on the head of a pm rather than really makmg an important distmctton, but the Court, a number of the litigants before the Court, and many people m the Umted States see these
distmctions as bemg absolutely crucial
What is the status oflaw m Oregon? In 1994, Oregon passed
the Death With Digmty Act that provided for physician assistance to the extent of wntmg a prescnptton for a dose of medication that will be used to end the patient's hfe. The voters, by
about a 60% to 40% margm last November, reaffirmed their
desire to have this statute on the books (Oregon Revised Statutes,
§§ 127 800-.897 [1997]). We have now seen the begmnmg of
the implementation of that act m Oregon It is important, I
thmk, to understand the safeguards that Oregon has tned to
design mto this statute.
Fust, the most important limitation may well be that only
competent patients, i.e., adult patients with decision-makmg
\
capacity, may participate m this exchange with physicians Minors are excluded, as are any adult patients who lack decistonmakmg capacity.
Second, this act is limited to patients who have a termmal
disease. Although termmal disease is not defmed any more precisely than it is under the Natural Death Act m Texas, it has to
be determmed m accordance with reasonable medical Judgment,
and it has to be certified by 2 physicians, specifically, the attendmg physician and a consultmg physician who has expertise m a
relevant area of medicme
Next, the patient's request has to be repeated over a fairly
long penod of time and has to be repeated, not once, not twice,
but 3 times There are 2 oral requests that the statute antteipates,
as well as a wntten one. I will descnbe those m more detail.
Ftrst, there 1s a 15-day waitmg penod after the patient's ftrst
oral request and before there can be a wntten request. Fifteen
days is also the mmimum time between the first oral request and
the second. This coolmg-off penod is mtended to give the pa-
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ttent, as well as family members and those who are providing care
for the patient, an opportumty to work through what 1t ts that
has moved the patient to make this request at this time. This
request may be a call for help, an indication of the failure, so far,
to deal with the pain that he or she 1s feeling, or an attempt to
deal with the loss of d1gmty that he or she 1s expenencing. Furthermore, over these 15 days, tf there ts a way to try to meet some
of these ob1ect10ns to the kmd of care the patient 1s receiving,
obviously thts ts the time to do 1t. Second, there 1s a mtmmum
2-day waiting penod between the wntten request and the wntten prescnption So, the whole process ts intended to be slowed
down by at least 1 7 days This ts not enough of a slowdown 1f
one 1s an opponent of phys1c1an-ass1sted sutc1de. Actually, this
17-day cooling-off penod 1s a point of contention with some proponents of phys1c1an-ass1sted sutctde, as well, who think this
wamng penod 1s really a demal of the due process nghts of patients.
The last couple of safeguards consist of the followmg: Physicians must ask tf they can notify the patient's nearest relatives
of the chmce that ts being made If the patient says no, the phys1C1an may not deny the prescnptton to the patient on thts basis, but 1t at least has to be discussed. In add1t1on, before wnting
the prescnptton, the physician must offer the patient the opportumty to rescmd the chmce. This must be exphctt and qmte affirmatively presented as an option
There also has to be a very detailed informed consent disclosure session with the patient The statute 1s qmte speC1fic and
goes on for about a page, which ts much longer than most informed consent statutes. All of the things that need to be disclosed with the patient are descnbed, including alternatives to
the use of the drug that the patient has requested, a detailed
descnpt1on of what will happen 1f these drugs are taken in the
prescnbed dose, and so forth. There 1s no blmkmg here m the
statute about what ts bemg discussed and what 1s bemg done All
of that has to be laid out with some care by the physician
In add1t10n, tf the physician has a reasonable behef that the
patient may be suffermg from some kmd of psychological or psych1atnc condmon, e.g., depression, 1t 1s mandatory for the physician to order a psychiatnc consult. There has to be some
attempt at counseling the patient before the rest of the statute
can be played out
We will see how long any of these safeguards actually survive over the next few years m the ht1g10us environment of
Oregon Frankly, I thmk that there are qmte respectable due
process and equal protection arguments that might be made
agamst one or more of the safeguards that have been set out m
the statute If that 1s the case, then obviously the class of patients
potentially affected, as well as the class of physicians who will
be brought mto this, will expand as these hm1tat1ons drop away.
Frequently over the years, I have heard Bob and a number
of other folks on ethics committees around the ctty talk about
choosmg the least bad death-deaths that are not that great no
matter what choice ts made. Therefore, f1gurmg out what ts the
least bad death, m terms of a patient's own system of values and
goals for treatment, ts very often all we are left with for d1scuss10n purposes It could well be argued that the policy chmce that
ts bemg made now or that was made, 1f you will, by the Supreme
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Court last year, 1s a chmce among the least bad alternatives m
dealmg with phys1cian-ass1sted smc1de and active euthanasia
My colleague Martha Mmow, who ts at the Harvard Law
School, has recently wntten a review of the Supreme Court cases
from last year that I have 1ust discussed (7) As she puts tt, there
are really 2 big hes we have to choose between In this sense,
these are the 2 least bad chmces that we are being asked to make
The first of these hes ts that proh1b1t10n will effectively prevent
the occurrence of phys1c1an-ass1sted sutc1de. The fact ts, even m
a state where 1t 1s clearly a felony to engage m this act, as tt 1s in
most of the states m this country, the polls published m JAMA
and the New England Journal of Medicine, among other places,
indicate that there ts considerably more acttvtty m this area than
1s normally publicly acknowledged. Proh1b1tion may chill people's
enthusiasm for 1t, prohib1t10n may d1mm1sh the numbers who are
wtllmg to engage m the activity, but 1t 1s pretty clear that proh1b1t1on will not prevent phys1cian-ass1sted smc1de any more than
proh1b1t1on statutes have ever prevented enttrely the act they
address
The second he Professor Mmow alludes to m her article 1s
the he that the legahzatton of phys1cian-ass1sted smc1de would
not systematically and routinely be used to push dying people
mto death. She 1s not talkmg necessanly about the "shppery
slope" here I thmk what she 1s talkmg about ts that the legal1zat10n of phys1cian-ass1sted smctde many legal system, whether
tt 1s the legal system of Texas, or Cahforma, or the USA as a
whole, changes the terms and cond1t1ons of the care that ts provided at the end of hfe, and that affects everybody. She puts 1t
this way: "Exits change what tt means to be here The nght to
termmate treatment makes contmumg treatment a daily chmce
The nght to termmate a pregnancy makes contmumg the pregnancy a deliberate act The nght to divorce makes mamtammg
a marnage a matter of vohtton. The nght to the atd of a doctor
m endmg one's hfe means that dymg patients will be mv1ted to
thmk about tts exercise It means that family members will consider 1t. It means that hospitals and nursmg homes will mstituttonahze it. It means that popular culture will elaborate lt. It
means that young and vibrant people will contemplate tt." Her
pos1t10n 1s that the Supreme Court, although 1t did not articulate these 2 pos1t10ns as 2 hes to choose between, in fact, did
choose one of these when tt said that proh1bmons agamst phys1cian-ass1sted smctde are constttuttonal. The pubhc pohcy
chmce that we are lookmg at over the next 5 to 15 years m every state m the country wtll be which of these positions ts the
least unappealmg to those who are m a pos1t1on to make the
chmce
DR. FINE: I want to wrap up with what, I hope, are some
pragmatic truths about bemg on the spot with the dymg patient
I am gomg to draw on a very mce article wntten by Dr. Andrew
B1llmgs and Dr Susan Block ( 8) They outlme for us a comprehensive assessment of the dymg patient that takes in account not
only the physical symptoms such as pain, nausea, weakness, and
dyspnea, but also social, psychological, and spmtual factors
Untreated pam 1s a common precursor to sutC1de attempts in our
society. We know from the Dutch expenence that when pain was
the reason why Dutch ctttzens were requestmg active euthanasia and 1t was effectively treated, the request for active euthana-
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sta was withdrawn. Unfortunately we have a long way to go The
SUPPORT study in this country revealed that half of dymg patients expenence poorly treated pain near death (9) In my own
expenence working as your ethics consultant here, I frequently
fmd that patients and the1r families doubt our ab1hty to treat pam
and other symptoms of dying They think that we cannot do 1t!
Sometimes, this causes them to seek early termmation of treatment If we can reassure patients that their pam can be managed,
that their symptoms can be taken care of, many will choose to
contmue hfe-sustainmg treatment and have a chance to get better. I thmk 1t ts important that we reassure our patients of both
the availability and our ability to treat then pain and other symptoms.
We also must assess and deal with the psychological issues
of dymg, includmg gnef, depress10n, and anxiety. This 1s easter
said than done Obviously, one of the biggest problems we face
ts that many of the vegetative symptoms of depress10n-mala1se,
fatigue, and so on-are the symptoms of innumerable termmal
illnesses Sometimes the only way you, as a physician, are gomg
to know 1f a patient ts suffermg with depression ts to consult with
a psychiatnst or psychologist. Often, we must try empmc treatment with antidepressants to determme 1f the vegetative symptoms w1ll 1mprove.
Dealing with spmtual and values issues 1s also important
The old adage that there are no atheists m foxholes rmgs true
for dymg patients as well. Amencan society ts a religious sooety Consider askmg the FICA questions of your patients Do you
have a rehg1ous or spmtualfarth? What is the involvement of that
faith in your life 7 Do you have a religious or spmtual community 7
How do you want to me to address your religious or sptntual concerns? Only by askmg these questions do you have a chance to
deal with them. Your patients and then families will often gmde
you through this process m their spmtual hfe 1f you give them a
chance At Baylor Umvers1ty Medical Center, we are fortunate
to have the additional expertise of skilled hospital chaplams.
Frequently, we must assess and deal with difficulties m interpersonal relationships. As health care professionals, we are all
fam1har with dysfunct10nal families, and the dysfunctional may
only get worse m the face of termmal illness Termmal illnesses
sometimes brmg out the best within fam1hes, but they also may
bring out some pretty unusual and difficult copmg mechamsms
withm families. We need to recogmze these and try to deal with
them as best as we can. Agam, I thmk this is where a multid1soplmary team approach comes m, with soCLal workers and
chaplams becoming important adjuncts to the overall treatment
effort
Fmally, I would hke for you to reflect with me on the nature of the phys1c1an-pat1ent relationship. The Jewish philosopher Martm Buber suggests to us m his most famous work, I and
Thou, that there are 2 fundamental relat10nsh1ps (10). One is
the "I-it" relat1onsh1p. When we see patients in an l-1t relationship, we come to view them as 1ust ob1ects to be mampulated m
the environment. When we talk man l-1t relanonsh1p, we often go back to those techmcal questions that are drummed mto
our heads m trammg, and the conversation often is somethmg
hke, "Can you tell me what the potassmm, the blood gas, and
the complete blood count are on the pneumoma m bed 12 7" The
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mformation ts necessary, but it is not sufficient for the best management of the dymg patient This conversat10n reflects the loss
of the umque humamty of the person with pneumoma
Buber suggests that a more appropnate relationship ts an"!thou" relationship It is a relationship of coequals based upon
mutual respect, mutual trust, and even mutual need. I thmk that
m order to create an I-thou relationship m the chmcal settmg
of the dymg patient, the physician has to be w1llmg to have a
different kmd of conversation that, I am afraid, does not happen as often as it should. Often, when I go m the role of ethics
consultant m an effort to work through some perceived problem
or cnsis around a dymg patient, one of the quest10ns that I will
ask the patient is somethmg along the lmes of, "I know it's d1ff1cult to talk about this, but would you hke to talk about the senousness of your illness and even the possibility of death 7" Most

When we finally accept that death is not our worst
enemy, we can begin to see death as a healing of
sorts. Death is, after all, inevitable and inescapable.
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patients say yes Almost mev1tably, the response I get from patients is, "Why, Dr. Fme, nobody has ever asked me that before."
This md1cates to me that none of the doctors and none of the
nurses have asked the patient that before. I will ask 1f 1t bothers
him or her that I have asked. Almost all welcome the discussion,
which then leads to quest10ns such as, "Where do you want to
be when you die?", "Who should be there?",,or "In your worst
moments, have you wLShed your death might come sooner 7" This
begms to open up the relat1onsh1p with the patient and moves
it beyond the l-1t techmcal necessmes (e g, knowmg the potassmm, the blood gas, and the complete blood count). The relationship becomes a more spmtual and lovmg I-thou that 1s
essential to the highest quality ofhealmgl
Remember that there is more than one type of healing.
When we finally accept that death 1s not our worst enemy, we
can begm to see death as a healmg of sorts Death 1s, after all,
mevitable and inescapable.
On that note, I want to end with a httle tale that Victor
Frankl wrote of in Man's Search for Meaning (11). VICtor Frankl
recalled a Persian folk tale involving a wealthy man and his servant They are walking through the garden of the wealthy man,
and the servant is walkmg ahead Suddenly, the servant comes
upon the figure of Death. Startled and fnghtened out of his wits,
the servant turns and runs as fast as he can the other way and
gets back to his master. He says, "Master, I have Just seen Death
m the garden, and he has come to take me. Please, I have been
such a faithful servant, may I have your fastest horse so that I
might escape and run away 7" The master says, "Certainly you
may. Take my fastest horse and flee to Teheran at once." And so
the servant does. The master contmues walking through the
garden, and he, too, comes upon Death, but, bemg a very brave
man and, frankly, a httle bit angry at this point, he looks Death
nght in the eye He confronts Death, and he says, "Death, why
did you scare away my trusted and loyal servant? He has done
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you no wrong. Surely, it is not his time to die." To this, Death
replies, "I did not mean to scare him so. I was only surpnsed to
fmd him here m the garden today when I planned to meet him
m Teheran tonight "
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